the winning of research grants, formed a major part of the way in which the reviewers on the RAE panels formed their judgements. Given the expertise involved (all those clever researchers and administrators), it would have been remarkable if this goal had not been achieved. British scientists have become much more keenly aware of the RAE requirement to publish in high-impact journals.
Yet the confident heyday atmosphere of British science has not returned. Nor have the Nobel prizes in the numbers to which the UK had been accustomed. So, what went wrong? Could it be that the RAE, far from directing funding to rare high-flying science of Nobel prize quality, has succeeded in doing precisely the opposite, while still achieving its objectives for the great majority of science? To use a Kuhnian 2 perspective, has it succeeded in identifying good 'normal' science, while failing to support the revolutionaries, or, even worse, dissuading them from their groundbreaking instincts? I came to the conclusion that this was probably the case through my own personal experience. It was clearly better to submit good, routine work in high-ranking journals than to risk poor assessment through submitting what I myself regarded as more groundbreaking work in less-well-known journals. I had already suffered the experience of being severely criticized and rejected by a research council on precisely these grounds. I had published a major paper in the 'wrong' journal.
It is worth pondering the reasons for this bias. Journal editors (I am one myself ) know that their journal's future impact factor depends on publishing papers that will be quoted as quickly as possible after publication, and hence those that fit the mould. Some of them even encourage the formation of what we may call citation clubs: prompting authors to add references to recent work in the same journal. Informal clubs of this nature have existed for a long time, created by the perceived need to refer to the work of those who might well be referees, often chosen from contributors to the journal. And so the success of the system becomes at least partly self-fulfilling. Success is not measured by something independent of the metric it depends on. Such systems are suspect because they progressively shift research towards what may be an unwarranted consensus. It is even possible to imagine totally unfounded 'subjects' flourishing in this way, with their own journals and adherents while, at the other extreme, editorial boards actively seek to exclude unpopular zero-cited articles. We are in an era when the process of measuring science is displacing judgement and so skewing what it tries to measure. And it does so with a false sense of accuracy: journal impact factors are quoted to three decimal places! Around the turn of the millennium I discussed this problem with several colleagues and found that I was far from alone in holding this view. I therefore wrote an article for the Times Higher Education Supplement (THES) in which I proposed that Oxford University, Cambridge University, University College London, Imperial College and the London School of Economics should lead the way by boycotting the RAE. 3 I had despaired of convincing people to drop the RAE in any other way. It seemed that the last hope of avoiding its effects on revolutionary science would be for the top five universities to refuse to take part. No-one, of course, was willing to do so, and such coordination would have been remarkable anyway, given the strong competition between them.
In fact, most of my colleagues concluded that I could not be serious in writing the article. But I was serious then and I am still, particularly because the scheme that is now to replace the RAE will perpetuate its main problem. In fact it will reinforce it because citation indices and impact factors will now become the overt deciders, rather than being just one of the parameters for judgement, albeit a key one.
Essay Review
What was missing from my THES article was really hard evidence that the RAE was as damaging as I and others felt it must be. Our argument was essentially common sense. Peer review and citation indices necessarily reinforce the kind of science that gets judged well by referees. Unpopular or groundbreaking work notoriously fares badly. It frequently gets classified in the cranky category. People are naturally fearful of wasting precious journal space and research funding on the cranks. But what if the cranks and the revolutionaries really are indistinguishable, even to expert judges, except with hindsight? And perhaps in very long hindsight indeed? It might then make sense to risk funding some of the cranks so as to capture the really rare groundbreaking work. Just one of those can outweigh 100, or even 1000, pieces of routine science. To take some examples, how do you weigh up relativity theory ( proposed by such a well-known 'crank' that he couldn't even get a proper academic job), or mathematical logic (likewise), against even 10 000 pieces of routine work? We are talking, of course, of Einstein and Frege. From this it is clear that 'crank' is the wrong word. I prefer 'heretic'. It captures the essence: someone who challenges accepted wisdom. Successful heretics become viewed as revolutionaries. Unsuccessful ones continue to be perceived as heretics. Donald Gillies's book provides the chapter and verse for precisely this view. His method is simple. If long (maybe 30 years or more) hindsight is the only viewpoint from which we can make such judgements, then historical research may be the only way to provide the answer. Gillies therefore documents individual cases of groundbreaking work and applies to them the criteria that the assessment exercises, RAE and its successor, REF (Research Excellence Framework), use. Before reading Gillies's book, I started out as a critic of the RAE and similar methods of assessment, so I admit to being biased, but even I could not have predicted the results of the historical approach. They are simply devastating. A copy of this book should be sent to every grants and REF committee to ponder carefully.
Gillies begins by considering the field of philosophy. He is himself a professor of the philosophy of science and mathematics, so this is an area close to his own expertise. It happens also to be one of my serious side-interests, so I know what he is talking about. By almost any criteria the most original philosopher of the twentieth century was Wittgenstein. His Tractatus logico-philosophicus (1921/22) and the later Philosophical investigations (1953) are books without which modern philosophy would not be what it is. And not just philosophy. Major aspects of modern science are, or should be, influenced by his work. 4 -6 We have Cambridge University to thank for the fact that he was given an academic home despite not publishing anything for a period of 17 years! Moving closer still to science, Gillies considers the case of Frege, the pioneer of mathematical logic (using the mathematical concepts of functions and arguments in place of the more language-based concepts of subject and predicate). Frege's work lies at the basis of computing today. In Frege's case we have the relevant RAE-type evidence before our very eyes: six contemporary reviews of his classic Begriffsschrift ('concept-writing') published in 1879. They are not just negative, they are damning in the extreme. It is impossible to imagine an RAE exercise favouring Frege. It took 20 more years for his work to receive any favourable notice at all, and 40 years for it to be fully recognized as groundbreaking. Impact factor? Forget it! Moreover, Frege would not have done well on the teaching assessments (such as the Quality Assurance Agency for Higher Education (QAA)) either. He was one of the world's worst lecturers.
Einstein's story is so well known that it hardly needs recounting here. In brief, he failed to get an assistantship, he failed to complete his PhD work with Weber, and when it was eventually completed (at a different institute) it was rejected. These are the reasons why he ended up working for the Swiss patent office in Bern. Relativity theory is of course a minefield of unconventional science, repeatedly courting rejection and animosity, starting with the Copernican and Galilean revolutions, through Einstein's various stages of relativity theory, to the work of scientists such as Nottale 7, 8 today. So far, we have the leading work in philosophy, the leading work in mathematical logic and the leading work in theoretical physics, all faring very badly indeed by RAE-like assessment. If you think there is just something peculiar to theoretical science and that this could not possibly happen in experimental science, you need to read Gillies's book. The same phenomenon can be identified historically in one example after another in all fields of science. In the remainder of this essay review I shall focus on three questions that arise.
Why are the successful revolutionaries and the unsuccessful heretics indistinguishable except in retrospect?
This is a fundamental question, because any RAE requires that it should be possible to distinguish between them. I have thought long and hard about this. My conclusion is that they are indistinguishable for a very simple reason: they share the same, heretical, mindset. As I have already argued, heresy is the correct word. Science, like religion, gets trapped in dogma-even sometimes using precisely that word. Think of the 'central dogma of molecular biology'-a concept badly in need of challenge (see, for example, articles by Noble 9 , Shapiro 10 and Werner 11 ). Historically, there are many other examples (Kelvin: the impossibility of knowing the chemistry of the stars; Laplace: the possibility of complete prediction of planetary movements knowing all positions and velocities; and so on). Challenges to such dogmas are necessarily tentative and unproven, particularly in the early stages. (Einstein: 'if at first an idea does not sound absurd, there is no hope for it.') The heretical mindset is one that is bloody-minded enough to persist even in the face of ridicule. Probably fewer than 1 in 100 heresies will succeed. But the ones that do are the pink diamonds. They change science for a very long period before sometimes becoming dogmas themselves, in their turn in need of challenge. I think, therefore, that we have to accept that distinguishing between unsuccessful and successful groundbreaking heretics is an impossible task except in a long-term retrospective study. If we want to encourage the revolutionaries, we need to accept that we will sometimes fund the unsuccessful heretics too.
2. Why was British science so successful in the first half of the twentieth century? Precisely because the above is what it did! As Gillies argues well in his book, Cambridge University, for example, in the heyday of British science, philosophy and mathematics, was a haven in which the unconventional could thrive. It was not alone in this. Other leading British universities took much the same attitude. Those they chose to appoint were given freedom to dissent, even at the cost of not publishing for long periods, or of forgoing promotion.
3. What could we do about the problems created by the damaging assessment exercises? Gillies has an intriguing answer: fund teaching! A whole chapter is headed 'Why rewarding teaching will improve research'. This is not a new idea, of course. This is the prime and Essay Review 100 original purpose of universities. Many of us have argued in the past that research and teaching go together and that it is false to think of them as separate activities in a university context. What is valuable in Gillies's book is that he considers the various objections in turn and carefully answers them. However, this is probably the most tentative part of his book. As he says himself, the idea needs much more development to be realistic as a way forward. But it is worthy of consideration. It should be part of the badly needed solution.
My own approach is rather different but not incompatible. I start from the fact that heresy usually (always?) develops from within the established system of thought itself. It is characteristic of particularly the successful heretics that they begin by mastering accepted wisdom. The proposal therefore would be that, when an academic has shown such mastery, he or she should be able to apply for what I will call an Exploratory Research Fellowship. This would provide funding that allows and, indeed, requires, unconventional thinking and that does not require judgement by results. In particular, failure would not count in one's research grant track record, because it would be recognized that unconventional research is unlikely to lead to high-impact publications. It would be expected that the academic concerned should investigate new ways of branching out, either into new disciplines or into interdisciplinary work. Implementing such a scheme would depend on universities' returning to their original culture: that of encouraging the individual independent thinker. Oxford and Cambridge might well achieve this within their college systems (the colleges are natural interdisciplinary bodies); other universities could reinforce their current tendency towards establishing interdisciplinary centres, which can be seen as the creation of a kind of college system-a good example is the Kroto Centre at Sheffield.
It is also important to give similar freedom to young academics. More start-up research fellowships with similar open-ended commitments should be created to enable at least some young scientists to begin their research without being forced to conform to the requirements of a large research team. Universities should exist to encourage heresy, not to create conforming clones. The university culture needs to swing back to what we know, historically, was successful.
Universities could even name these fellowships after their own favourite successful heretics. Frege Fellowships, anyone? Make up your own scheme. And convince the research agencies of the need to fund them if we are to recreate the glory days of British science.
NOTES

